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Résumé / Abstract 
 
De toutes les questions fondamentales qui demeurent en finance, celle que j’adresse dans ce 
document est liée à la gestion du risque au sein des entreprises. L'hypothèse que j’élabore 
dans cette étude est que les habitudes des dirigeants et l’inertie organisationnelle contribuent 
aux décisions d’achat d'assurance et de gestion des risques par les entreprises. Puisqu’il est 
impossible d'obtenir des données publiques sur la gestion des risques et l'achat d'assurance par 
les entreprises, j’examine un aspect particulier de cette demande d'assurance pour laquelle 
l'information existe  : l'assurance de la responsabilité civile des administrateurs et des 
dirigeants. Les résultats que je présente supportent l'hypothèse selon laquelle les habitudes et 
l’inertie organisationnelle contribuent à la fonction de demande d’assurance des 
administrateurs et des dirigeants. Mes résultats soulèvent la question des rôles que jouent les 
habitudes des dirigeants et l’inertie organisationnelle dans les stratégies plus globales de 
gestion des risques d’une entreprise. 
 
 
Mots clés : assurance de la responsabilité civile des administrateurs et des 
dirigeants, formation d’habitudes, assurances et gestion des risques des 
entreprises, rémunération des conseils d’administration. 
 
 
Of the many fundamental questions left unanswered in finance, one relates to corporate risk 
management practices. My contention in this paper is that managerial habits and 
organizational inertia play an important role in the decision to purchase corporate insurance 
and engage in risk management activities. Because public access to corporate insurance 
purchases and risk management strategies is limited, I examine a particular aspect of the 
corporate demand for insurance for which public information is available: Directors' and 
officers' insurance. My results show that some measure of organizational inertia is an 
important determinant of the demand for insurance. This raises the interesting question of 
how big of a role does managerial habit and corporate inertia play in the firm's overall risk 
management strategy? 
 
Keywords: directors' and officers' insurance, habit formation, corporate 
insurance and risk management, board compensation. 
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 1 Introduction and Motivation
1.1 Introduction
Of the many fundamental questions left unanswered in ﬁnance, one relates to corporate risk man-
agement practices. Put diﬀerently, it is still relatively unclear why corporations actively manage
their idiosyncratic risk. Purchasing insurance policies and investing in risk management are two
common practices that are inherently costly but that do not necessarily increase shareholder wealth.
Indeed, because shareholders have access to the ﬁnancial markets, they are better equipped than
corporations to hedge idiosyncratic risk through diversiﬁcation. A recent article by Guay and
Kothari (2003) shows that the value created in non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms through the use of derivatives
instruments is quite small. Moreover, if a clear consensus existed on the value to the ﬁrm of risk
management, we should not see ﬁrms in the same industry (for example, the gold mining industry)
arguing, often time vehemently, on whether risk management creates or destroys value, not only
for each ﬁrm, but for the entire industry.
I argue in this paper that because corporations are plagued with inertia, risk management deci-
sions (and general management decision for that matter) may have more to do with the managers’
previous decisions than with a current and forward looking strategy. As a result, managerial habit
and corporate inertia may be important risk management determinants. I deﬁne organizational
inertia similar to Dewatripont and Tirole (1996), Prendergast and Stole (1996) and Boyer and
Robert (2003): An organization is plagued with inertia if it is unwilling to change ex post what it
did ex ante.
Many ﬁnancial and governance measures have been hypothesized to have an impact on risk
management. To show that managerial habit and organizational inertia may play a role, my
contention is that none of these measures work as well as a measure of organizational inertia
and/or of managerial habit formation.
Because public access to corporate insurance purchases and risk management strategies is lim-
ited, I examine a particular aspect of the corporate demand for insurance for which public infor-
mation is available: Directors’ and Oﬃcers’ (D&O) insurance. My approach is similar to that used
by Mayers and Smith (1990) who also inferred corporate risk management decisions indirectly by
looking at insurer demand for reinsurance. My indirect look at corporate risk management rests on
the assumption that the demand for insurance by directors and oﬃcers is a proxy for the ﬁrm’s risk
management strategy. Presumably, the variables that determine D&O insurance demand should
also determine the ﬁrm’s investment in risk management processes. Examples of such variables are
the expected cost of bankruptcy and of ﬁnancial distress.
Directors’ and Oﬃcers’ (D&O) insurance is also linked to the human capital argument wherein
corporations must manage risk to attract and retain the best managers, oﬃcers and corporate di-
1rectors; otherwise they need to pay them more.1 As representatives of the corporation directors and
oﬃcers are personally responsible and liable for actions committed by the corporation. This
means that their own personal assets are at risk in the event of a lawsuit against the corporation.
One way for a corporate director to protect his personal wealth is to have the corporation buy
insurance on his behalf.
My paper’s original contribution is two-fold. First, I study an aspect of corporate governance
that has not been studied much in the past. Information regarding D&O insurance has never been
publicly available before 1993. The public information I use is clearly more reliable than the survey
data used in the past. Second, I test for the presence of organizational inertia in risk management
activities.
1.2 Motivation and goal
The foremost reason why corporations should manage their risk is the progressive nature of the
tax schedule (Smith and Stulz, 1985): The more volatile a corporation’s earnings, the greater
are the beneﬁts associated with managing this risk. This argument holds best when earnings are
indeed insurable. Unfortunately the basis risk associated with most insurance policies is very large.
Another aspect of the tax code, the possibility to carry forward and carry back earnings, also
weakens the convexity-in-the-tax-schedule argument to explain corporate insurance purchases (see
Graham and Rogers, 2002).
The presence of non-tradable human capital within a corporation also appears to be a good
intuitive explanation to insure. Given that some stakeholders, such as workers and managers, may
have the great majority of their human capital tied up in the corporation, it becomes essential
for it to manage its risk in order to attract and retain the best workers and managers. Financial
distress is another good intuitive and theoretical reason to hedge to calm consumer and supplier
fears about the future of the corporation. Finally, over-investment (investing in negative net present
value projects) and under-investment (not investing in positive net present value projects) may be
curtailed through risk management and insurance.2
Based on the theoretical ﬁndings of Froot et al. (1993) and Stulz (1996), Tufano (1996) con-
jectures that only two reasons explain why corporation should and would manage their risk. The
ﬁrst is to maximize the value of the ﬁrm; the second is to protect risk averse managers. (see also
Smith and Stulz, 1985, and Dionne and Garand, 2000). Related to the human capital hypothesis,
a special type of insurance, known as Directors’ and Oﬃcers’ (D&O) insurance, oﬀers protection
to corporate managers. If managerial risk aversion is an important determinant of risk manage-
1The few papers that studied D&O insurance did not consider the insurance aspects of the contracts. For example,
researchers in ﬁnance (Holderness, 1990) and accounting (Core, 1997) view D&O insurance as part of the managers’
compensation package. The insurance aspects of D&O insurance contracts is still largely left untouched.
2See Trieschmann et al. (1994) for a quick overview of the insurance practices in this area.
2ment activities, managers should value the presence of an insurance contract that protects against
liability lawsuits brought upon them as managers of the corporation. Suprisingly, according to a
study of Tillinghast-Towers Perrin (1999), it is the ﬁrm’s stakeholders who are the most likely to
sue managers: 44% of lawsuits originate from shareholders, 29% from employees and 14% from
clients.
D&O insurance covers managers for their court expenses as well as for any settlement arising
from the lawsuit, subject of course to a policy limit (the maximum amount). As a result, The
Economist (June 14th, 2003, p. 14) claims that D&O insurance provided by corporations goes
against managerial accountability. Settlements may sometimes be substantial as shown in the 2001
Cendant Corp. case where a 2.83 billion dollars award was paid to the company’s shareholders
because of accounting fraud. The most notorious case is arguably that of Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group Inc. where a 1.2 billion dollars settlement was paid.
D&O insurance is quite common amongst U.S. and Canadian public corporations. According
to Tillinghast-Towers Perrin (1998, 1999) the proportion of U.S. ﬁrms that had D&O insurance was
92% in 1998 and 93% in 1999, up from 81 % in 1992. The market penetration of D&O insurance
is smaller in Canada where 84% of surveyed corporation had D&O insurance in 1998, and 73% in
1999. About 24% of U.S. public corporation (and 14% of Canadian public corporations) had to face
lawsuits related to the behavior of their management between 1989 and 1999. This proportion was
64% for U.S. corporations whose assets are worth in excess of 10 billion dollars. D&O insurance
therefore appears to be an important feature of the compensation package of managers. One must
then wonder what aﬀects the purchase of D&O insurance and its structure.
Given that their own personal wealth is fair game when a suit is ﬁled against a corporation and
its representatives, and given that there is a probability that the corporation will not be able to
compensate managers for their court expenses (or settlement), managers should require that their
personal wealth be insured if they are to be involved with a corporation. In place of insurance,
managers may demand higher pay to compensate for the risk they are facing. D&O insurance is
therefore a risk management tool to manage the risk faced by risk averse managers.
1.3 Findings
My ﬁndings lends support to some of the main economic theories that underly corporate risk
management and insurance purchases. Managerial risk aversion and the need for real service appear
to be determiants of the demand for D&O insurance. Size, ﬁnancial distress and ﬁnancial structure
do not appear to play any signiﬁcant role, however. Even corporate governance, which Tufano
(1996) found to be an important determinant, plays no role. In contrast to Core (1997, 2000) and
Chalmers et al. (2002), I ﬁnd no evidence of managerial opportunism with respect to the D&O
insurance coverage. One possible absence of any evidence may be due to the sunk cost associated
3with risk management decisions as mentioned in Chacko et al. (2001) where they write
“Risk management decisions seem motivated as much by ﬂuctuations in the cost and
availability of ﬁnancing as by ﬂuctuations in either operating cash ﬂows or desired
investments" (p. 451).
An important factor that determines the amount of D&O insurance coverage purchased is my
measure of managerial habit and/or organizational inertia. This begs the interesting question
of how big of a role does managerial habit and corporate inertia play in the ﬁrm’s overall risk
management strategy. Kaltchev (2003), using a proprietary database of U.S. public corporations,
also ﬁnds that inertia play an important role in the structure of the D&O insurance policy, but
not as important as the one I ﬁnd. The diﬀerence in the results may be due to four factors. First,
it may be that the U.S. corporations do not behave in the same way as Canadian corporations.
Second, Kaltchev uses information from a unique insurance broker whereas I use information that
is publicly available in the management proxies. Third, the period under study is diﬀerent. Finally,
it may also be that I have more years in my data, which allows a better test of the organizational
inertia hypothesis.
Before discussing the previous literature, I present a short overview of the D&O insurance indus-
try. Section 3 presents the empirical model and discusses why habit formation and organizational
inertia are important factors to consider when studying the behavior of economic agents. In Section
4 I present the econometric approach used and the results of the analysis. I conduct robustness
checks in Section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Directors’ and Oﬃcers’ Insurance
2.1 A Short Overview
I present a short overview of the D&O insurance markets in North America based on the more
detailed accounts found in Core (1997, 2000), Chalmers et al. (2002), Gutiérrez (2003) and Boyer
(2003).
The environment in which directors and oﬃcers of a corporation operate may sometimes be
extremely diﬃcult. Not only can a corporation be liable for its behavior, the corporation’s man-
agers may also be liable. Any of the ﬁrm’s stakeholders may question a manager’s ﬁduciary duty
toward them. Gutiérrez (2000) argues that lawsuits may be brought upon the managers personally.
Corporations can purchase D&O insurance coverage to protect managers against losses associated
with the lawsuit.
The D&O insurance policy covers all expenses and losses incurred by a manager as the result
of a lawsuit brought upon him as a representative of the corporation, except in the case of gross
4negligence or criminal behavior. As with other standard insurance contracts, D&O insurance
contracts stipulate a premium to be paid, a policy limit as well as a deductible.
Most D&O insurance contracts are written on a "claims made and reported" basis (CMR).3
CMR contracts diﬀer from regular occurrence based contracts in that they cover losses that are
made and reported during the policy year even though such claims may have been incurred in
previous years. In contrast, occurrence based contracts cover losses that are incurred during the
policy year no matter when the claim is reported in the future. Suppose for example that an incident
occurs in 1995, but is not reported until 1998 when a claim is ﬁled. Under a CMR contract, all
the ﬁnancial responsibility for the loss falls upon the 1998 insurer. Under an occurrence based
insurance contract, it is the 1995 insurer who is responsible.
Directors’ and Oﬃcers’ insurance policies are mainly sold by insurance brokers who negotiate
with insurance companies on behalf of the insured. In Canada, the top-2 insurance brokers hold
a 66% market share in terms of the number of accounts. In premium terms, the top-2 insurers
hold a 50% market share in the United States. In Canada, a majority of corporations receive
their D&O insurance coverage from one unique insurer, namely Chubb. So-called sticky points also
characterize the D&O insurance market: Coverage limits are sold by layers of $1,000,000, although
the most important steps appear to be $5,000,000.
2.2 Previous Literature
Few studies have been conducted on the demand for D&O insurance. This is mainly due to the
lack of public information prior to 1990.4 The Cadbury report in the United Kingdom and the
Dey report in Canada changed that by recommending to their respective securities commission to
make available more information on the risk faced by publicly traded corporations and the tools
used to manage that risk. The reports also recommended that more information be made available
regarding managerial compensation. As a result, corporations in both countries were mandated to
make public information related to their D&O insurance purchases.
Core (1997, 2000) was the ﬁrst to use the newly available data on D&O insurance purchases by
Canadian companies. Using a sample of 222 ﬁrms whose ﬁscal year ended between 31 May 1994 and
31 December 1994, he ﬁnds that the most important determinants of D&O insurance purchase is
whether the risk of a lawsuit5 or the risk of ﬁnancial distress are high. Although he ﬁnds signiﬁcant
determinants of the corporate demand for D&O insurance, he cannot ﬁnd any evidence that D&O
insurance is in any way part of the overall compensation package oﬀered to managers. My study
3See Doherty (1991) for more details regarding claims made and reported insurance contracts compared with
occurrence based contracts.
4The only information available prior to 1990 was collected by Wyatt and Associates (now part of the Tillinghast-
Towers Perrin group) via surveys.
5As in Romano (1991), Core (1997) argues that the most important factor used to determine the risk of a future
lawsuit is whether the corporation was sued in previous years.
5builds upon his approach by increasing the sample size and the number of years used.
A second study, by O’Sullivan (1997), uses a sample of 366 corporations in the United Kingdom.
O’Sullivan ﬁnds that the same factors that explained D&O purchase in Canada (Core, 1997) also
explain D&O purchase in the United Kingdom. He concludes that large corporations use D&O
insurance coverage as an incentive tool for managers to work in the best interest of shareholders so
that manager share ownership and D&O insurance coverage are corporate governance instrument
substitutes.
In the United States, Kaltchev (2003) uses a proprietary database obtained from an insurance
broker to conduct a study similar to the one I present here. Contrary to the present study, he ﬁnds
evidence in favor of some well-established theories about the demand for risk management. He also
ﬁnds evidence supporting the organizational inertia hypothesis presented here. Related evidence of
the importance of shareholder litigation in the United States can also be found in Romano (1991),
Peng and Röell (2003) and Kim (2004).
Earlier papers by Bhagat, Brickley and Coles (1987) and Janjigian and Bolster (1990) ﬁnd that
D&O insurance coverage does not seem to alter shareholder wealth or returns. A similar result is
obtained by Brook and Rao (1994) who ﬁnd that corporations that make provisions for lawsuits do
not have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent stock returns than corporations that do not make any provisions.
A recent paper by Chalmers et al. (2002) studies the interaction between of D&O insurance
coverage and IPO under pricing using an original sample of ﬁrms going public with a speciﬁc in-
vestment bank. Their study, using 72 observations points, is based on earlier studies by Ibbotson
(1975) and Tinic (1988) who argued that IPOs are initially under priced as a way to prevent share-
holder lawsuits when the stock falls in the long run. They ﬁnd that corporations with substantial
D&O insurance coverage were, on average, more likely to be sued in the future for mispricing.
Speciﬁcally, the greater the D&O insurance coverage, the less under priced was the stock at the
time of the initial public oﬀering.
Only one paper to my knowledge examines in details the modelling of Directors’ and Oﬃcers’
insurance. Gutiérrez (2003) presents a model where D&O insurance is used as a commitment device
for stockholders to monitor the behavior of corporate directors. The paper follows in the steps of
Sarath (1991), but innovates by having an uninformed principal purchase insurance on behalf of
an informed agent because the insurer cannot observe ex post the true eﬀort of the agent.
3 The Determinant of D&O Insurance Purchases
I divided the determinants of D&O insurance purchase into two broad categories: Corporate risk
management and Organizational inertia. In the ﬁrst case, there are six traditional reasons that
may explain D&O insurance purchase based on the corporate risk management literature. In the
second case, I present why managerial habit and, to a lesser degree, organizational inertia may be
6prime determinant of D&O insurance purchases.
The main hypothesis of this paper is that managerial habit is an important determinant of
the use of D&O insurance in an organization. Because directors are, presumably, more aware and
more preoccupied by their own personal assets than the shareholders’ wealth, my results may be
indicative of the overall determinant of what drives corporate investments in risk management.
3.1 Six traditional reasons to manage corporate risk
There are six traditional reasons why ﬁrms should manage their risk: Managerial risk aversion,
asset substitution, real services, ﬁnancial distress, managerial signalling, and the convexity of the
tax schedule. I present each reason in turn.
1- Managerial Risk aversion
Risk averse managers may assign positive value to a ﬁnancial instrument that protects their
personal wealth in the event of a lawsuit. As a result, D&O insurance may be inﬂuenced by
the composition and compensation of the board of directors and the ownership structure of the
corporation. I use two measures of board composition, one of compensation and one of ownership.
In terms of board composition I expect that the greater the number of board members, the
costlier a lawsuit would be. I therefore expect a greater policy limit and a greater deductible
when the number of board members (Members) is larger. Board member origin should also be
important. For example, a board member who is not an oﬃcer, related to an oﬃcer nor a former
employee is deﬁned as an outsider. I expect that the greater the proportion of outsiders (Outsiders)
on the board, the greater the need for insurance in order to attract better directors to sit on the
board. Corporations that have relatively more outsiders on its board should therefore purchase an
insurance policy that has a greater limit and a smaller deductible. For board Compensation, I
use the boards’ total annual cash compensation. I do not include stock option awards or restricted
stock awards in the directors’ compensation.
My ﬁnal measure of risk aversion is the corporation’s ownership structure. A corporation whose
ownership structure is more concentrated should manage risk more because owners are less likely to
be well diversiﬁed (see Mayers and Smith, 1990). I measure stock ownership concentration using the
Herﬁndahl index (Herfindahl) of the major shareholders: The more concentrated the ownership,
the more risk averse should the corporation behave.
2- Asset substitution
Absent sound risk management practices, managers may under-invest in positive NPV projects
because they focus too much on the downside of the project. The argument is basically that
managers put too much weight on the bad outcomes and too little on the good outcomes. By
managing risk, a manager can better evaluate the weights of the diﬀerent outcomes so that the
incentives to under-invest are reduced. Risk management forces managers to reinvest in risky
7positive NPV projects in the event of an insured loss. Bessembinder (1991) suggests that large
negative changes in the book value of assets may be a sign of under-investment. I then deﬁne my
Divestor variable as equal to the log of last period’s book value of assets when the book value of
assets decreased by 20% over the previous year’s and zero otherwise.
At the other end of the spectrum, over-investment may occur if managers, who act in the
stockholders’ best interest, over-invest in risky project (possibly in negative NPV projects) because
all of the risk is borne by the creditors. Over-investment should be observed when managers go on
a spending spree, perhaps by acquiring new business through investment, mergers or acquisitions.
I measure over-investment (Acquiror) as the log of the book value of assets when the book value
of assets increased by 20% or more and zero otherwise.
In both cases, I expect a larger policy limit following an important change in the book value of
assets.
3- Real services
Firms that provide risk management and insurance services are often better equipped to assess
and control the risk than the insured party: It is their core business. Insurer expertise should
be needed more when litigation is more common. Clarkson and Simunic (1994) report that the
Canadian legal system is less litigious than the American legal system so that corporations that
have important activities in the United States are exposed to more litigation risk and thus in
the direst need of insurer services. Because the majority of lawsuits are brought by shareholders
under U.S. security laws (typically an accounting irregularity), the most important D&O risk for a
corporation appear to be whether it violated some SEC rule (see Eitel, 2000).
The probability of litigation is therefore higher for ﬁrms that are listed in both the United
States and Canada as opposed to ﬁrms listed in Canada only so that insurer services may be more
valuable for ﬁrms listed in the United States. Corporations that are listed on a U.S. stock exchange
(USListed) should therefore have a greater policy limit and a larger deductible.
4- Cost of ﬁnancial distress
As shown by Stulz (1996), risk management reduces the expected cost of bankruptcy and
ﬁnancial distress. I use six variables to measure these expected costs.
Size is an important determinant of a risk management practices because larger corporations
incur lower expected bankruptcy costs (see Mayers and Smith, 1990, and Smith and Stulz, 1985).
Another reason why larger corporation do not need as much insurance is that they may be better
able to self insure (see Stulz, 1996). For example, large corporations may have an in house litigation
department that handles lawsuits. As in Core (1997), I shall use both the log of the market value
of equity (Ln(MV E)) and the log of the market value of assets (LnAssets) for my measure of size.
The ﬁrst one is a market measure whereas the second one is an accounting measure.
A corporation whose stock price is more volatile faces greater cost of ﬁnancial distress, so that
8directors in corporations whose stock price is more volatile will seek more protection. V olatility
is calculated as the annualized standard error of the stock’s compounded daily returns. V olatility
increases the probability that the corporation will ﬁnd itself in ﬁnancial distress.
The way in which a corporation is ﬁnanced should aﬀect the decision to purchase D&O insur-
ance. For example, a bankrupted corporation may not be able to honour its promise to ﬁnancially
support its managers’ legal fees in the event of a lawsuit so that the expected loss borne by man-
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This variable measures the probability that a put option on the corporation’s assets will be exercised
at a strike price equal to the book value of debt. A higher bankruptcy risk should be associated
with more insurance coverage.
The corporation’s capital structure is measured through the ratio of the book value of debt
to the quasi-market value of assets calculated as the book value of debt plus the market value of
equity. Thus,
Debt =
Book Value of Debt
Book Value of Debt+Market Value of Equity
Corporations that have a higher measure of Debt are more at risk of being in ﬁnancial distress.
It may also be important to control for a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability because ﬁnancially healthy ﬁrms
face lower ﬁnancial distress costs. Presumably, the higher the return the happier shareholders,
clients and employees will be. Thus the higher the past returns, the smaller should be the coverage.
I use the ﬁrm’s return on assets (ROA) as my measure of proﬁtability.
5- Managerial signalling
According to DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1991), asymmetric information between managers and share-
holders should force good managers to hedge to send a clearer signal as to their type. This informa-
tion asymmetry should be more problematic when a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows and investment opportunities
are more diﬃcult to assess. Information asymmetry may be related to whether a corporation is
seen as a growth or a value company. Because managerial decisions are more complex in growth
corporation, information asymmetry is more likely to occur in these types of ﬁrms. The deductible
and the policy limit should therefore be larger for growth ﬁrms. I measure Growth as the ratio of
the market value of equity to its book value.
6- Taxes
The convexity of the tax schedule is the sixth argument in favour or risk management. Corpo-
rations that want to reduce their expected tax liability will want to smooth earnings when the tax
schedule is convex. Moreover, the more convex the tax schedule the more important the smooth-
ing of earnings is and the more important risk management becomes. This factor should have no
9impact whatsoever on the demand to D&O insurance (see Core, 1997); as a result I do not include
it in the analysis.
3.2 Corporate habits
An individual’s habit is an organization’s inertia. In both cases, the economic agent is unwilling
(or unable) to change ex post what he decided to do ex ante.
3.2.1 Individual habits
For individuals, habits play a very important role. Smoking may have more to do with habit
than a clear and calculated decision to light up. The medical profession recognizes the importance
of habit in smoking so that it suggests to those who want to quit smoking to avoid places and
circumstances they associate with smoking (bar, parties) until they no longer associate the place
or the circumstance with their habit. Even buckling one’s seat belt in an automobile has become
a habit for many, even if it is only to drive around the block.
Habit is also an important part of political life. Shachar (2002) argues that one of the most
important determinants of a voter’s decision in the voting booth is for whom he voted in the
previous election (see also Zuckerman, 1990). Habits are harder to change when individuals are set
in them for a long time. For example Shachar shows that older voters are less likely to change the
party they voted for than younger voters.
Economists are recognizing more and more the importance of habit formation in consumption.
For example, although it is generally accepted that the consumer price index overstates increases
in the real cost of living6 because it assumes that agents do not change their consumption habit
when prices ﬂuctuate, for the elderly, however, the CPI overstates increases less. This is known as
the substitution eﬀect in the CPI-basket. One reason why the CPI overstates inﬂation less for the
elderly is that they are less likely to alter their behavior than younger individuals. In other words,
older individuals are more likely to keep their habits. Given that the substitution eﬀect accounts
for more than 40% of the overstatement, it is argued that the elderly have more to lose following
a restatement of the CPI.
In the ﬁnance literature, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) present a model of habit formation to
explain the equity premium puzzle. The Campbell and Cochrane argument relies on the fact that
in periods of low consumption growth the marginal utility of consumers is very volatile so that they
require a higher premium to invest in risky assets. Although Campbell and Cochrane assume a
constant risk free rate to achieve their result, their model predicts relatively well the observed risk
premium. Wachter (2002) relaxes the constant risk free rate assumption. Her contention is that
6The 1996 Boskin commission in the United States (see the Advisory Commission to the U.S. Senate, 1996) argued
that the consumer price index overstates the real inﬂation by approximately 1.1%. See also Crawford (1998), Shapiro
and Wilcox (1996), Cunningham (1996) and Hoﬀmann (1998).
10past consumption growth is a good (negative) predictor of short-term interest rates. The reason
is that agents ﬁnance their habits through short-term borrowing when past consumption growth
has been low. As consumption growth is low, agents borrow more, which drives short-term interest
rates up.
In each of these approaches it is always assumed, implicitly if not explicitly, that it is very costly
for some individuals to move away from their habit. Although the habit is diﬀerent in each setting
(smoking in the case of addicts, personal consumption in the case of the elderly, party aﬃliation in
the case of voters and aggregate consumption in the case of ﬁnanciers), the gist of the argument is
the same: Changing one’s habit is diﬃcult and costly.
3.2.2 Corporate inertia
Corporations may also be plagued with habits or organizational inertia. Inertia may play important
roles in risk management decisions (and general management decision for that matter) and in
corporate governance for two reasons.
First, managers may have taken an optimal decision in the past and wait a few years before
amending it. As the outcome of a strategic decision may take a few years to pan out, it may
appear that habits are important when in fact there is a clear decision to delay evaluating the
past decision. Boyer and Robert (2003) follow this discourse in examining inertia in organizations.
They assert that inertia in an organization is necessarily the result of asymmetric information.
Following Rumelt (1995) who argues that it is the future promise of managerial inertia ex post that
provides the incentives for change ex ante, Boyer and Robert build a model where a ﬁrm’s strategic
positioning on a market depends on the equilibrium between the ex ante gains associated with the
commitment to a production process (the organization’s inertia) and the ex post gains of ﬂexibility
in the production process chosen ex ante (see also Boyer and Moreaux, 1997). In other words ex
ante eﬃciency is obtained to the detriment of ex post eﬃciency, as asserted by Dewatripont and
Tirole (1996).
Another possible way to explain managerial habits is to say that managers may fear to look
weak if they change their past decision in the future. Changing one’s decision is to admit that
one has made a mistake. In that exact vein, Prendergast and Stole (1996) develop a model where
individuals are unwilling to change their decision even after new information has arrived. The
corporate world may not be very kind to managers who admit to have made mistakes. Prendergast
and Stole write: “Eventually changing the investment becomes associated with (the manager’s)
previous errors.” Managers may therefore be unwilling to change their decision by fear of reprisal
by the ﬁrm’s stakeholders. Prendergast and Stole attribute this inﬂexibility of older managers to
what is known in the psychology literature as cognitive dissonance reduction.
In both cases managers will appear to base their decisions more on what they did in the
11past than on perceptions of what will happen in the future. In that sense, habit formation and
corporate inertia are important factors in managing corporations and in managing the risk within
the corporation.
3.2.3 Measuring inertia and habit
Organizational inertia and individual habits are arguably behavioral measures. As a measure of
inertia, I shall use the number of years during which the D&O insurance contract has not changed.
As a result, the Inertia variable may take values from 1 to 7, depending on the number of years
since the corporation had a diﬀerent deductible or policy limit. My main hypothesis in this paper
is that Inertia should have a signiﬁcant negative impact on insurance coverage. If this is the case
(and it is, as we shall see), one is led to wonder to what extent risk management processes are
determined by organizational inertia and managerial habit.
4 Econometric Approach
4.1 Data Source and Sample
The sample I used is drawn for the population of Canadian manufacturing corporations that does
not include ﬁnancial institutions, utilities or natural resource ﬁrms. The original sample of 1519
observations was reduced to 1502 because of incongruities in the ﬁnancial statements. No survivor
bias exists in the data since companies appeared or disappeared during the period under study. Of
the ﬁnal sample’s 318 ﬁrms, 60% have information for ﬁve or more years and 17% no longer existed
at the start of 2000.
D&O insurance was purchased by an average of 70% of the ﬁrms for any sample year, with a
peak of 74% in 1998 and a through of 67% in 1993. For comparison, Tillinghast-Towers Perrin
(1999) reports that 84 % of Canadian corporations purchased D&O insurance in 1998. In the
United States, 92% or ﬁrms purchased D&O insurance in 1998.
By law (see the statutes of the Ontario Securities Commission), basic information regarding
D&O coverage is available from the management proxies and information circular, along with de-
tails related to managerial compensation and board composition. Since 1996 all this information
is available on the internet site of SEDAR (http://www.sedar.com/). Prior to this date the in-
formation must be collected from the companies directly (for free allegedly), or from Micromedia
(at a price). Financial data was obtained from three diﬀerent sources, depending on the company:
Compustat, Stock Guide and CanCorp Financial. I obtained stock prices and returns form the
TSE-Western tapes.
124.2 Dependent Variables
I use three diﬀerent dependent variables. First, I have a dichotomous variable to see whether
D&O insurance was purchased or not. Of the 1502 observations, 1066 report the ﬁrm having D&O
insurance. Second, I have the policy limit that gives us the maximum possible indemnity paid by
the D&O insurance policy for any single event or year. Third, I have information regarding the
contract’s deductible. This deductible gives us the amount the corporation (or the managers) must
pay out-of-pocket before the insurance coverage kicks in.7 To reduce problems associated with the
extreme measures, I used the logarithm of the dollar ﬁgure in the analysis.
5 Results
5.1 Basic Statistics
Table 18 presents the basic descriptive statistics of my data set before running the regressions. Once
lagged variables are included, the number of observations in the data set is reduced from 1502 to
1158. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the remaining observations. Looking only at
those corporations that purchased D&O insurance on the open market (820 ﬁrms), Table 3 presents
their descriptive statistics and highlights the statistical diﬀerences between the corporations that
carry D&O insurance and the corporations that do not.
Based on this table one could think that there are indeed diﬀerences between corporations that
purchase D&O insurance and corporations that do not. For instance, it appears that corporations
that purchase D&O insurance are larger, more growth oriented, more likely to be cross-listed on
an U.S. stock exchange, more likely to have acquired a new business unit and have more corporate
insiders on the board.
5.2 D&O Purchase
Before exploring what aﬀects the limit and the deductible of the policy, it is essential to determine
D&O insurance purchases. An interesting characteristic of my sample regarding the D&O insurance
is that ﬁrms that purchase D&O insurance do so for all the years, and ﬁrm that do not purchase
D&O insurance never do. This means that there is no way to explain why some corporation
purchase D&O insurance and other don’t based on diﬀerences in the explanatory variables. In fact,
by using a simple ﬁxed eﬀect model, I am able to completely separate the data according to D&O
insurance purchases. As a result, all the variability of the model is explained using only ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects.
7I used the highest of the individual or corporate deductible as my deductible measure. In some instances the
ﬁrm did not specify whether there was any deductible even though they had purchased D&O insurance. In that case
I set the deductible to equal 10,000 dollars, the lowest amount in the data set. Results are sensibly the same if we
set it to zero or omit the observation altogether.
8All tables are in the appendix.
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characteristics of the ﬁrms that do not change over time. This lends support, albeit unconvincing,
to my inertia hypothesis in the determination of D&O insurance coverage. One can imagine that
managers that never had D&O insurance coverage do not request it because they do not see its
use; and managers that have had it cannot think why they would get rid of it.
How can we explain this dichotomy that does not appear to be related to the corporation’s
ﬁnancial or governance structure? One possible explanation relies on the claim made and reported
(CMR) structure of D&O insurance contracts. CMR contracts (see Doherty, 1991, for more details)
act as a lobster trap in the sense that corporations who purchase it one year can never realistically
get rid of it in the future. By their structure, CMR contracts act as a organizational inertia tool in
the sense that ﬁrms have a diﬃcult time dropping the insurance coverage altogether in the future.
Even if the CMR contract structure explains why corporations never get rid of their D&O
insurance contract, it does not explain why some ﬁrms never purchase it. This observation is
better explained by considering that some CEOs, like Warren Buﬀet of Berkshire-Hattaway, do not
see the utility of protecting corporate directors because it reduces their incentives to work hard.
As a result, the ﬁrm may never purchase D&O insurance only because the CEO does not want to.
In both cases, the habit of managers in not purchasing the contract (or the CEO’s beliefs) and the
inherent inertia associated with CMR contracts seem to play an important role in the purchase for
D&O insurance.
5.3 Policy Limits and Deductible
Although the previous section’s results support the idea that market conditions have no impact on
a corporation’s decision to purchase D&O insurance or not, these conditions may have an impact
on the contract’s speciﬁcations such as the policy limit and the deductible. The current section of
the paper is devoted to the analysis of the limit and of the deductible.
The two set of results I present in Table 4 (Model 4.1 does not include the Inertia variable
whereas Model 4.2 does) assume that the deductible and the policy limit choices are made inde-
pendently of each other. Even if this is not the case because policy limits and deductibles are,
presumably, negotiated simultaneously, the OLS results using ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects are strik-
ing.9
In the ﬁrst column of Model 4.1 I present the empirical model to explain Canadian corporations’
policy limit purchases. It appears that none of theories presented in Section 3 of the paper are
able to explain D&O insurance policy limit purchases. Although the size of the corporation as
measured by the log value of assets has almost signiﬁcant impact on the policy limit, the impact
9More sophisticated econometric techniques presented in the Robustness section of the paper do not provide much
diﬀerent results.
14is the opposite of what was expected according to the ﬁnancial distress cost hypothesis. No other
variable has any signiﬁcant impact on the policy limit.
On the deductible side of Model 4.1, two variables appear to have a signiﬁcant impact: V olatility
and USListed. Corporations whose stock is more volatile and corporations that are listed on a
U.S. stock market purchase D&O insurance policies that have larger deductibles. In the case
of Volatility, the impact is opposite to what was expected according to the ﬁnancial distress
cost hypothesis. For USListed, the impact is positive, as hypothesized, so that the real service
hypothesis appear to be supported. No other hypothesis is supported, however.
In Model 4.2 I include my measure of corporate inertia to the OLS regression. According to
the corporate inertia hypothesis, the greater the Inertia, the smaller should be the policy limit
and the deductible because they did not keep pace with the corporation’s growth. In Model
4.2 regression results, the Inertia measure reduces signiﬁcantly both the policy limit and the
deductible, as hypothesized. Corporate inertia therefore appears to be an important determinant
of D&O insurance purchases. By adding Inertia to the policy limit regression, the compensation
and the asset variables become signiﬁcant. In the ﬁrst case, this is evidence in support of the
risk aversion hypothesis. It appears that the greater the compensation of board members, the
lower the protection (in terms of policy limit) that is needed. In eﬀect, directors may require more
compensation if they are not protected properly. With respect to the Ln(Assets) variable, the
positive impact on the policy limit is contrary to the predictions of the ﬁnancial distress hypothesis.
No other variable has any signiﬁcant impact on the policy limit. In the case of the deductible, the
results do not change compared to those of Model 4.1 as only the Volatility and the USListed
variables are signiﬁcant, and only USListed has the expected sign.
The diﬀerent hypotheses put forth in the ﬁnance and risk management literature to explain the
amount of insurance purchased or the amount invested in risk management processes do not ﬁnd
much support in my analysis, except for the real service oﬀered by insurers (USlisted). Inertia
and USlisted are the only variables whose impact are signiﬁcant and of the predicted sign.
The results presented in Table 4 are obtained using an OLS approach. This may not be the most
suitable methodology if, for example, the policy limit and the deductible are chosen simultaneously.
In the next section of the paper I conduct robustness checks to test whether the OLS analysis biases
the results in any way; as will be evident, the OLS results are quite robust.
5.4 Robustness
I want to test the robustness of my results in three ways. First, I control for issues that may arise
if the policy limit and the deductible are chosen simultaneously using the two-step approach shown
in Woolridge (2002). Second, for each year I run a cross section regression similar to that of Model
3.1, but including a sector ﬁxed eﬀect instead of a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect. This was the methodology used
15by Core (1997) for his unique sample year. Third, instead of using a ﬁxed eﬀect approach, I use a
ﬁrst diﬀerence approach so that my dependent variables become the one-year diﬀerence in policy
limit and deductible.
5.4.1 Simultaneous equations
Using a two-step approach (see Woolridge, 2002) I present in Table 5 the results when the deductible
and the policy limit are assumed to be chosen simultaneously. Given the results of the OLS analysis
presented in Table 4, the instrument I used for the policy limit is the log value of assets whereas
the instrument for deductible is the stock return volatility. The structural equations (the results of
the reduced form regressions are not presented) for the regression presented in Table 5 are
Limiti,t = XLimit
i,t + LnAssetsi,t + ￿ Deductiblei,t + dt + di + ηi,t
and
Deductiblei,t = XDeduct
i,t + Volatilityi,t−1 + ￿ Limiti,t + dt + di + ξi,t
where Xk is the matrix of independent variables that explains dependent variable, where k =
{Limit,Deductible}, dt is the dummy variable for the years (the year ﬁxed eﬀect) and di is the
dummy variable for the corporations (the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect). Variables that have a￿are the predicted
value of the dependent variables obtained from the reduced form regressions.
The results presented in Model 5.1, without the use of the Inertia variable, are sensibly the
same as those of Model 4.1, with the diﬀerence that ownership concentration, as measured by the
Herfindahl of block ownership, now has a negative impact on the deductible. The impact of all
the other variables is the same as that presented in Model 4.1.
In Model 5.2, when the Inertia variable is included in the regression, the results are the same
when looking at the determinant of the policy limit as those presented in Model 4.2. With respect
to the deductible, however, the results are slightly diﬀerent. For example, it seems that ownership
concentration as measured by the Herﬁndahl index is signiﬁcant. The negative impact of the
Herfindahl variable on the deductible supports the risk aversion hypothesis. Corporations whose
stock ownership is more concentrated will opt for more insurance coverage because the owners may
not have a well-diversiﬁed stock portfolio. The Inertia variable is no longer signiﬁcant in explaining
the deductible once the possible simultaneous choice of the policy limit and of the deductible are
taken into account. Interestingly, neither predicted dependent variable has any signiﬁcant impact
on the other dependent variable, which may raise doubts about the need to use a two-step approach.
5.4.2 Cross-Sections
Tables 6 and 7 present the OLS regressions for each sample year using the policy limit and the
deductible, respectively, as the dependent variable. As is apparent in both tables, the only de-
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Inertia variable on the policy limit (Table 6). No other variable has a signiﬁcant impact on either
dependent variable for every year. Interestingly, in Table 6, the coeﬃcient for the Inertia variable
changes radically in 1996 as its value drops by almost 50% from 0.311 to 0.150. At the same time,
the size of the log of the book value of asset coeﬃcient doubles from 0.373 to 0.772. In Table 7, the
same radical shift occurs when one looks at the Inertia variable’s impact on the deductible. Prior
to 1996, Inertia had a signiﬁcant and negative impact on the deductible, but not after 1996. One
must the wonder whether there was a structural shift in the D&O insurance market in 1996.
In 1995, in the United States Congress passed a new securities law that would take eﬀect in
1996. One of the goals of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995 was to
encourage institutional investors to become more involved in the prosecution of securities’ lawsuits.
A direct impact was an increase in the size of the settlements, which means that larger corporations
were more at risk of losing a lot of money. As a result, corporations with important activities in
the United States had to change their insurance policies. This impact of the new U.S. legislation is
quite evident in the Table 6. In 1997, we observe a sizable increase of the policy limit for Canadian
corporations listed on an American stock exchange, as the USListed variable is signiﬁcant for that
year only.
Another goal of PSLRA was to make it easier for judges to dismiss securities fraud class action
lawsuits. This had the unanticipated result that plaintiﬀs sued for greater amount because plaintiﬀs,
who saw an increase in the probability that their case was going to be dismissed, began to claim for
higher damages in order to keep the same level of revenue as before the Reform Act of 1995. That
is a perfect recipe for an increase demand for insurance. An agent whose loss occurs with greater
severity but lower frequency will always be more likely to purchase insurance that an agent whose
loss occurs with lower severity but greater frequency, even if the expected loss is the same for the
two agents.
Overall, the organizational inertia hypothesis presented in section 3.2 of this paper seems to
ﬁnd robust support when looking at cross-sectional regressions. The evidence presented in Tables 6
and 7 is quite clear to that eﬀect: Inertia has a signiﬁcant negative impact on the policy limit for
every sample year and on the deductible for the two years prior to the enactment of the PSLRA.
5.4.3 One-Year Variation
The last robustness check I conduct is to look at one-year variations instead of ﬁxed eﬀects. The
dependent variables are now deﬁned as year t′s policy limit (respectively deductible) minus year
t − 1′s policy limit (respectively deductible). The dependent variables are now called DifLimit
and DifDeduct. The basic results do not change much: The OLS regression results presented in
Model 8.1 for the policy limit and in Model 8.2 for the deductible show no sign that the results
17presented previously are not robust.
In both regressions the Inertia variable is negative and signiﬁcant at the one percent level,
indicating that changes in the insurance policy are less pronounced the longer the policy has been
in place. This is consistent with the view that old habits are hard to change so that a board whose
D&O insurance policy has not changed for ﬁve years will not see the need to change it now. On the
other hand, a board that has changed its policy recently may wonder if last year’s decision was the
best so that it may consider altering the contract this year again. In any case, the organizational
inertia hypothesis appears to be supported by the empirical results presented in Table 8.
6 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to further our understanding of the corporate demand for insurance. To
do so I analyzed the determinants of the demand for insurance of corporate managers as part of
their function within the corporation. Directors’ and Oﬃcers’ liability insurance protects managers
against lawsuits brought onto them as representative of the corporation. Corporation can buy
insurance coverage to compensate their managers in the event of losses arising from such lawsuits.
In this paper we analyze what inﬂuences the purchase by a corporation of insurance on behalf of its
corporate managers. Moreover, I determined how the policy limit and the deductible are chosen.
My conclusion is straightforward: D&O insurance purchases are strongly determined by to
corporate habit and/or organizational inertia.
After controlling for time and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, few ﬁrm speciﬁc factors seem to be able to
explain the amount of insurance purchased other than the variable used to measure organizational
inertia. In fact, aside from the real service hypothesis, no corporate risk management theory appears
to ﬁnd validation in my analysis. For example, a ﬁrm’s distress costs and ﬁnancial structure do
not appear to play any signiﬁcant role. Even corporate governance, which Tufano (1996) found to
be an important determinant, plays no role. Moreover, and in contrast to Core (1997, 2000) and
Chalmers et al. (2002), I ﬁnd no evidence of managerial opportunism.
The only factor that consistently appears to be signiﬁcant in determining the amount of D&O
insurance coverage purchased is my measure of managerial habit and/or organizational inertia.
This prompts the question: How inﬂuential is corporate inertia in determining corporate risk
management strategy? Dewatripont and Tirole (1996), Prendergast and Stole (1996) and Boyer
and Robert (2003) present theoretical models where corporate inertia plays an important role.
Using a proprietary database of U.S. public corporations, Kaltchev (2003) also ﬁnds that inertia
play an important role in the structure of D&O insurance policies.
What do the results say about risk management and insurance practices within corporations?
What is the implication of such practices when studying risk management strategies? If risk
management practices are more due to habit than to a clear and concise strategy in managing the
18risk faced by a corporation, then one has to wonder if managing idiosyncratic risk does not in fact
waste valuable corporate resources. This argument has been used previously in the literature in
trying to justify that stockholders are better equipped to manage idiosyncratic risk by diversifying
their portfolio. On that point, Guay and Kothari (2003) show that non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms have little
use for derivative contracts, so that ﬁrms do not appear to manage idiosyncratic risk much.
Another possible explanation is that managers do not care about the cost of D&O insurance
because the cost is borne by others. Basic microeconomic theory tells us that demand for a good
is much larger than the equilibrium demand when the price is kept artiﬁcially below market. In
the case of insurance in general and of D&O insurance in particular, moral hazard then leads to
over-consumption of the insured product.
It therefore appears that the demand for directors’ and oﬃcers’ insurance may not be completely
due to a rational planning on the part of the management team. This begs the question: What
happens to other types of risk that may require management? If there is no explicit decision making
in the management of corporate board risk - a risk that aﬀects board members more directly than
any other risk in the corporation - one has to wonder whether other types of risk are managed
similarly. If that is the case, then surely corporations do not maximize their value when they
engage in risk management.
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Table 1.





Insured 1502 0.700 0.454 0 1
Log(Limit) 1066 16.52 1.005 13.82 19.24
Log(Deductible) 936 11.49 1.275 9.210 17.03
Log(MVE/1MM) 1476 5.049 1.863 0.236 16.26
Log(Assets/1MM) 1502 5.292 1.752 0.104 11.00
Volatility 1422 0.512 0.321 0.082 2.496
Growth 1476 8.995 120.9 -58.74 2980
Debt 1476 0.407 0.231 0.004 0.984
Bankruptcy 1411 -6.830 7.765 -165.0 -0.186
ROA 1502 0.018 0.150 -0.994 1.994
US Listed 1502 0.113 0.317 0 1
Outsiders 1502 0.621 0.169 0 1
Insiders 1502 0.297 0.144 0 0.857
NumBoard 1502 8.740 2.966 3 17
Herﬁndahl 1447 0.211 0.222 0 0.984
Some variables are not included in this table (Acquiror, Divestor, Compensation)
because they rely on lagged values.
24Table 2.





Insured 1158 0.723 0.448 0 1
Log(Limit) 837 16.60 0.991 13.82 19.24
Log(Deductible) 737 11.53 1.302 9.210 17.03
Log(MVE/1MM) 1149 5.133 1.885 0.236 16.26
Log(Assets/1MM) 1158 5.419 1.751 0.105 11.00
Volatility 1119 0.507 0.302 0.082 2.382
Growth 1149 9.389 129.2 -58.74 2981
Debt 1149 0.415 0.231 0.004 0.973
Bankruptcy 1112 -6.558 6.350 -96.55 -0.203
ROA 1158 0.018 0.152 -0.985 1.994
US Listed 1158 0.133 0.340 0 1
Outsiders 1158 0.623 0.171 0 1
Insiders 1158 0.293 0.144 0 0.857
NumBoard 1158 8.792 2.955 3 17
Compensation 1158 -0.010 0.103 -0.602 1.000
Herﬁndahl 1113 0.211 0.224 0 0.984
Acquiror 1158 1.807 2.732 0 10.32
Divestor 1158 0.242 1.069 0 9.266
None of the means in Table 1B are statistically diﬀerent from the means in Table 1A
25Table 3.
Descriptive statistics for the 837 observations where D&O insurance





Log(MVE/1MM) 828 5.217∗ 1.858 1.018 16.26
Log(Assets/1MM) 837 5.438∗ 1.650 2.110 11.00
Volatility 801 0.501 0.284 0.082 2.094
Growth 828 12.22 152.1 -58.74 2981
Debt 828 0.403 0.235 0.004 0.973
Bankruptcy 794 -6.572 6.396 -96.55 -0.603
ROA 837 0.016 0.141 -0.865 0.519
US Listed 837 0.148∗ 0.355 0 1
Outsiders 837 0.631 0.162 0 1
Insiders 837 0.297∗ 0.143 0 0.857
NumBoard 837 8.748 2.834 3 17
Compensation 837 -0.010 0.110 -0.587 1.000
Herﬁndahl 805 0.203 0.222 0 0.96
Acquiror 837 1.914∗ 2.772 0 10.32
Divestor 837 0.244 1.063 0 8.103
* are variables whose mean between ﬁrms that purchased D&O insurance and ﬁrms
that did not purchase D&O insurance is statistically diﬀerent at the 5 % level.
In each case the mean for corporations that do not carry D&O insurance was
statistically smaller than the mean for corporation that do.
26Table 4.
The Determinants of Policy Limit and Deductible Amounts
Ordinary Least Square Regressions with Firm and Year Fixed Eﬀects
Variable
Model 4.1
No measure of inertia
Model 4.2
With organizational inertia
Limit Deductible Limit Deductible
Ln(MVE) 0.026 (0.065) 0.081 (0.108) -0.004 (0.056) 0.070 (0.108)
Ln(Assets) 0.167 (0.086) -0.148 (0.142) 0.148∗ (0.073) -0.155 (0.141)
Volatility 0.055 (0.070) 0.230∗ (0.116) 0.063 (0.060) 0.233∗ (0.115)
Growth /1000 -0.196 (0.252) -0.040 (0.418) 0.019 (0.217) 0.036 (0.417)
Debt -0.071 (0.275) 0.649 (0.456) -0.064 (0.236) 0.641 (0.453)
Bankruptcy -0.002 (0.003) -0.009 (0.005) 0.001 (0.002) -0.008 (0.005)
ROA -0.112 (0.152) 0.023 (0.253) -0.014 (0.131) 0.057 (0.252)
US Listed 0.095 (0.063) 0.374∗∗ (0.104) 0.052 (0.054) 0.358∗∗ (0.104)
Outsiders -0.047 (0.158) -0.032 (0.261) 0.100 (0.135) -0.013 (0.260)
NumBoard 0.006 (0.015) 0.041 (0.025) -0.002 (0.013) 0.038 (0.025)
Compensation -0.813 (0.513) -0.101 (0.851) -1.495∗∗ (0.443) -0.340 (0.852)
Herﬁndahl -0.088 (0.210) -0.638 (0.349) -0.118 (0.181) -0.648 (0.348)
Acquiror 0.002 (0.006) 0.002 (0.010) -0.004 (0.005) -0.000 (0.010)
Divestor 0.016 (0.014) -0.005 (0.023) 0.014 (0.012) -0.006 (0.023)
Inertia -0.162∗∗ (0.012) -0.057∗ (0.023)
FIRM F.E. YES YES YES YES
TIME F.E. YES YES YES YES
R2 0.941 0.922 0.957 0.923
In Model 4.1, neither OLS regressions (for the log of the policy limit and for the log of the deductible)
include a measure of corporate inertia. Model 4.2 includes such a measure. Inertia is a count variable
that speciﬁes how long the D&O insurance contract has not changed. All regressions include year
and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀets. Coeﬃcients with a ∗ are signiﬁcant at the 5 % level; ∗∗ at the 1 % level. Standard
errors are in parentheses. The number of observations used in all the model speciﬁcations is 735
27Table 5.
The Determinants of Policy Limit and Deductible Amounts
Structural Equation with Firm and Year Fixed Eﬀects
Variable
Model 5.1
No measure of inertia
Model 5.2
With organizational inertia
Limit Deductible Limit Deductible
Ln(MVE) 0.007 (0.068) 0.104 (0.127) -0.023 (0.057) 0.066 (0.105)
Ln(Assets) 0.202∗ (0.094) N/A 0.190∗ (0.082) N/A
Volatility N/A 0.278∗ (0.127) N/A 0.299∗ (0.133)
Growth /1000 -0.187 (0.252) -0.214 (0.472) 0.009 (0.217) 0.055 (0.415)
Debt -0.225 (0.333) 0.585 (0.411) -0.241 (0.286) 0.583 (0.408)
Bankruptcy 0.000 (0.003) -0.011 (0.005) 0.003 (0.003) -0.007 (0.005)
ROA -0.118 (0.152) -0.076 (0.269) -0.030 (0.131) 0.042 (0.252)
US Listed 0.006 (0.133) 0.457∗∗ (0.143) -0.045 (0.110) 0.413∗∗ (0.123)
Outsiders 0.054 (0.158) -0.010 (0.262) 0.104 (0.135) 0.092 (0.271)
NumBoard -0.004 (0.019) 0.046 (0.027) -0.012 (0.016) 0.036 (0.025)
Compensation 0.790 (0.515) -0.823 (1.105) -1.403∗∗ (0.457) -1.909 (1.677)
Herﬁndahl 0.064 (0.286) -0.715∗ (0.358) 0.057 (0.246) -0.773∗ (0.366)
Acquiror 0.001 (0.006) 0.004 (0.010) -0.004 (0.005) -0.004 (0.010)
Divestor 0.017 (0.013) 0.009 (0.026) 0.016 (0.012) 0.009 (0.025)
Inertia -0.147∗∗ (0.019) -0.227 (0.157)
Deductible
(Predicted)
0.237 (0.304) 0.271 (0.258)
Limit
(Predicted)
-0.886 (0.847) -1.049 (0.954)
FIRM F.E. YES YES YES YES
TIME F.E. YES YES YES YES
R2 0.941 0.922 0.957 0.923
In Model 5.1, neither structural regressions (for the log of the policy limit and for the log of the deductible)
in the two-step procedure include a measure of corporate inertia. Model 5.2 includes such a measure. Inertia
is a count variable that speciﬁes how long the D&O insurance contract has not changed. All regressions
include year and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀets. Coeﬃcients with a ∗ are signiﬁcant at the 5 % level; ∗∗ at the 1 % level.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The number of observations used in all the model speciﬁcations is 735
28Table 6.
The Determinants of D&O Insurance Purchases: Year by Year Regression
Dependant Variable is the log of the Policy Limit.



















































































































































































Each regression is an OLS regression with the log of the policy limit as the dependent variable.
A regression is ran for each year of the sample. Every model speciﬁcation uses the measure of
Inertia which is a count variable that speciﬁes how long the D&O insurance contract has not changed.
All regressions include a sector ﬁxed eﬀet. Coeﬃcients with a ∗ are signiﬁcant at the 5 % level;
∗∗ at the 1 % level. Standard errors are in parentheses. The number of observations used in each
regression varies depending on how many ﬁrms are in existence each year.
29Table 7
The Determinants of D&O Insurance Purchases: Year by Year Regression
Dependant Variable is the log of the Deductible.



















































































































































































Each regression is an OLS regression with the log of the deductible as the dependent variable.
A regression is ran for each year of the sample. Every model speciﬁcation uses the measure of
Inertia which is a count variable that speciﬁes how long the D&O insurance contract has not changed.
All regressions include a sector ﬁxed eﬀet. Coeﬃcients with a ∗ are signiﬁcant at the 5 % level;
∗∗ at the 1 % level. Standard errors are in parentheses. The number of observations used in each
regression varies depending on how many ﬁrms are in existence each year.
30Table 8.
The Determinants of Changes in the Policy Limit and in the Deductible Amounts








Ln(MVE) -0.015 (0.044) 0.078 (0.065)
Ln(Assets) 0.001 (0.046) -0.068 (0.069)
Volatility -0.066 (0.057) 0.056 (0.085)
Growth/1000 0.075 (0.109) -0.114 (0.161)
Debt -0.081 (0.185) 0.292 (0.275)
Bankruptcy -0.002 (0.002) -0.004 (0.004)
ROA -0.040 (0.103) 0.360∗ (0.152)
US Listed -0.091∗ (0.039) -0.017 (0.057)
Outsiders -0.147 (0.124) 0.024 (0.184)
NumBoard -0.002 (0.006) -0.011 (0.009)
Compensation 0.029 (0.112) 0.019 (0.166)
Herﬁndahl -0.025 (0.058) -0.048 (0.085)
Acquiror 0.011∗ (0.005) -0.012 (0.007)
Divestor -0.001 (0.012) 0.004 (0.018)
Longterm -0.097∗∗ (0.011) -0.061∗∗ (0.016)
FIRM Fixed Eﬀect No No
TIME Fixed Eﬀect Included Included
R2 0.133 0.047
OLS regressions for the chang in the log of the policy limit and of the log of the deductible.
The regressions do not include a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect, but they include a year ﬁxed eﬀect.
Coeﬃcients with a ∗ are signiﬁcant at the 5 % level; ∗∗ at the 1 % level. Standard errors
are in parentheses. The number of observations used in both regressions is 735.
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